Through a Glass, Darkly: Medieval Cultural Studies at the End of History by Eileen Joy
INTRODUCTION
THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY: MEDIEVAL 
CULTURAL STUDIES AT THE END OF HISTORY
Eileen A. Joy and Myra J. Seaman
A historical work . . . that recognizes how the archaic, the past, the “primitive,” the medieval continues 
to inhabit the present as an inheritance of traumas unresolved and still demanding resolution . . . might 
also recognize the possibility that doing history can mean a commitment not just to excavating the past 
but to considering how the past inheres in the present in such a way as to demand that the present, and 
thus the future, be thought otherwise.
—Steven F. Kruger, “Medieval/Postmodern: HIV/AIDs
and the Temporality of Crisis”
. . . the study of culture without politics is an inane undertaking.
—Françoise Meltzer, “Future? What Future?”
The End of History
On 29 April 2005, The New York Times reported the following: “In a showdown 
that  featured inside-the-Beltway lobbying and bare-knuckle boardroom nego-
tiating, Donald J. Trump and President Bush eff ectively squared off  yesterday in 
pursuit of the same parcel of real estate—a piece of the NBC-TV prime-time 
lineup. And it was the president who blinked fi rst.”1 The day before the White 
House had scheduled a press conference for 8:30 p.m. and NBC had requested 
it be moved to 8:00, so that it would not interfere with their highly rated reality 
TV program The Apprentice, scheduled to begin at 9:00. Other networks, such 
as Fox Broadcasting and CBS, had originally planned not to run the  president’s 
press conference at all, because they did not want to preempt their highly pop-
ular shows—The O.C. and Survivor, respectively. In the end, the White House 
agreed to move the press conference to 8:00 and all three networks decided to 
give it live  coverage. Yet despite the White House’s capitulation, NBC and CBS 
9781403973078ts02.indd   1 9/28/2007   4:01:15 PM
E I L E E N  A .  J OY  A N D  M Y R A  J .  S E A M A N2
stopped their  coverage at exactly 9:00 p.m. before the president was fi nished with 
his parley with  reporters, refusing to allow The Apprentice and Survivor to be 
preempted for even the one minute that was all that was actually left of the press 
conference. It was clear that President Bush himself was both aware of and ner-
vous about when the TV networks might cut away from him, because midway 
through the hour he delayed questions from the print media, saying, “Let me 
fi nish with the TV people fi rst.”2 And toward the end of the hour, he called for 
the fi nal question from the press, saying, “I don’t want to cut into some of these 
TV shows that are getting ready to air . . . for the sake of the economy.”3
The entire aff air raises the question of whether or not the press conference, 
a “real-time” (because it is aired live) historical event, had entered the realm of 
reality entertainment. That a presidential press conference might not have been 
considered generically diff erent from other so-called reality TV programs, and, 
furthermore, was judged ahead of time to be less marketable than its prime-time 
fi ctional competitors, seems to have already been well understood. In a Washington 
Post article on the event the following day, media critic Lisa de Moraes referred to 
Bush’s live appearance as a “non-news conference,” and elsewhere in her article 
placed the word “news” within quotation marks to underscore her view that the 
press conference was not, in fact, news. While acknowledging that Bush “runs the 
country,” de Moraes also wrote that “[f ]ortunately . . . wiser men run the broadcast 
networks, men who know what it means to preempt ‘Survivor,’ ‘C.S.I.’ and ‘The 
O.C.’ ”4 Although de Moraes does not, in fact, tell us what it means to preempt 
these shows (she assumes, obviously, we already get that), her comments display 
a real comfort with the idea that the press conference itself is no more real than 
what happens every week on that distant island in Survivor, because it is just as 
staged, yet infi nitely less appealing.5 
In this scenario, a presidential press conference is not only non-news, it is not 
even history-in-the-making, but just another media commodity to be slotted into 
the time period that best suits its market, or cancelled entirely for its perceived 
inability to produce an audience. The televised speech of an American presi-
dent is simply understood—by network executives, reporters, cultural critics, and 
viewing audiences alike—as just another cultural production to be judged (or 
appreciated), not on the basis of its truth-value or lack thereof, or even on its rela-
tion to the pressing concerns of a general public, but on its ability or inability to 
attract an audience. And the question of its likelihood to do such has already been 
decided in advance, primarily because everyone has already agreed that what-
ever the president has to say isn’t real, much less compelling, even as fi ction. Has 
American politics fi nally entered into the realm (or is it a temporal zone?) of the 
post-everything post-histoire? Francis Fukuyama tells us that the twentieth cen-
tury has witnessed “the end of history” precisely because of the supposed triumph 
and universalization of a process of modernization that produces Western liberal 
democracy as “the fi nal form” of human government.6 If Fukuyama is correct, 
does this mean that at the moment Western liberalism triumphs—if not over the 
entire world’s political aff airs, then at least over the dominant consciousness perco-
lating through a universal consumer culture that touches in some fashion all parts 
of the world—is that also when certain organs of that liberalism (the U.S. govern-
ment, let’s say) become secondary to the agents of free-market consumerism they 
have unleashed?
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According to Fukuyama, the triumph of one particular ideology—Western 
liberalism—over all others also means “the end of ideology,” and, therefore, of 
the struggles (national and international) over competing political belief systems. 
Although Fukuyama (a neoliberal who once worked as an analyst at the RAND 
Corporation) clearly believes that political liberalism and a free-market economy 
represent the progressive and happily inevitable end-stage toward which history 
has always tended (in this respect, he is  thoroughly Hegelian),7 he does not deny 
the ambivalence, and even despair, he  sometimes feels toward what he views as 
the impersonality and vacuity that seems to inhere in  liberal consumerist socie-
ties, where “economic calculation, the endless solving of technical  problems . . . and 
the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands” has replaced the interior and 
 cultural struggles over “big ideas” and the spiritual self, and he sees in the post-
historical world “neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the 
museum of human history.”8 The “showdown” between President Bush and the 
TV networks would seem to mark a certain post-historical moment when a free-
market consumerism has triumphed, and everything has fl attened into what we 
would call the real estate of culture. It is as if Derrida’s message were, fi nally, not 
only for the grammarians or the literary critics: everything really is text, and the 
problem, as Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt write, is that, “[i]f an entire 
culture is regarded as text, then everything is at least potentially in play both at the 
level of representation and at the level of event. Indeed, it becomes increasingly dif-
fi cult to maintain a clear, unambiguous boundary between what is representation 
and what is event,” and “if all the textual traces of an era ‘count’ as both representa-
tion and event . . . then it is increasingly diffi  cult to invoke ‘history’ as a censor.”9
How to account for our peculiar moment in history when there seems to be 
no end to the number of very real historical and political traumas of the most 
highly shocking nature, from the events of 9/11 to the war in Iraq with its sui-
cide bombings to the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib to the genocide in 
Sudan and beyond, while at the same time, there has never been such a prolifera-
tion of fi ctionalized “reality” entertainments? These very real historical traumas 
are presented to us in every narrative form imaginable, from live multimedia 
coverage to journalistic print accounts to testimonial transcripts to memoirs to 
photographs to on-line streaming video to radio documentaries to fi ctionalized 
movies; nevertheless, more Americans are drawn to watching the pseudo-reality 
of TV programs such as Fear Factor and Survivor than they are to, say, down-
loading the thousands of pages of transcripts of the “Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission” hearings from post-apartheid South Africa. And even when some 
of us do fi nd ourselves drawn to, for example, the on-line video of the beheading 
in Karachi, Pakistan, on 31 January 2002, of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel 
Pearl, how do we watch this real act of terror without letting it slip in our minds 
into some kind of recursive, spectral performance that we are already intimately 
familiar with through horror fi lms and our own nightmares?10 When we look 
at the digital photographs of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers in 
Abu Ghraib prison, how do we separate in our minds the real event being pho-
tographed from the sadomasochistic fantasies and stock pornographic images that 
inspired their staging? For the photographs were, after all, staged, and arrived to 
us belatedly, not as documentary evidence of torture and abuse, but as the theater 
of that abuse and the dark psychology underlying it.
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The public outrage over the incidents at Abu Ghraib—what little outrage 
there was—may have had less to do with what actually went on within the 
prison’s walls and more to do with the perceived tastelessness or obscenity of the 
perpetrators turning it into entertainment, even pornography. As Susan Sontag 
wrote about the photographs, there was a “displacement of the reality onto the 
photographs themselves. The administration’s initial response was to say that the 
president was shocked and disgusted by the photographs—as if the fault or horror 
lay in the images, not in what they depict.”11 It would appear that the perpetra-
tors themselves unwittingly touched upon something else for which they did not 
require the insight of cultural critique: the life not  mediated by the images of the 
semblance of itself is not worth living, or, is not yet real. Or, as Sontag wrote, 
“to live is also to pose. To act is to share in the community of actions recorded 
as images. The expression of satisfaction at the acts of torture being infl icted on 
helpless, trussed, naked victims is only part of the story. There is the deep sat-
isfaction of being photographed, to which one is now more inclined to respond 
not with a stiff , direct gaze (as in former times) but with glee. The events are 
in part designed to be photographed. The grin is a grin for the camera. There 
would be something missing if, after stacking the naked men, you couldn’t take 
a picture of them.”12 This state of aff airs may have something to do with what 
Guy Debord noted in The Society of the Spectacle: all that “once was directly lived 
has become mere representation,”13 which also calls to mind Daniel Boorstin’s 
famous commentary: that Americans live “in a world where fantasy is more 
real than reality, where the image has more dignity than its original. We hardly 
dare face our bewilderment, because our ambiguous experience is so pleasantly 
iridescent, and the solace of belief in contrived reality is so thoroughly real.”14 
But how to understand this state of aff airs (if, indeed, this is our state of aff airs) 
alongside the contemporary “passion for the Real,” whether in the form of shock 
memoir, “end of the world” disaster movies, confessional talk shows, or reality 
TV? At what point did reality become a culture industry unto itself, and for what 
reasons? And what happens to Debord’s idea that “[c]ulture is the meaning of an 
insuffi  ciently meaningful world”15 in such a scenario?
In Welcome to the Desert of the Real! Slavoj Žižek discusses many diff erent 
instances throughout the twentieth century, in both political and cultural life, 
of what he terms a “passion for the Real”—a type of human desire for touching 
reality through its semblances that Žižek argues creates a “fundamental paradox” 
culminating “in its apparent opposite, in a theatrical spectacle.”16 Žižek traces the 
manifestations of this passion through a broad range of “reality simulations” from 
Stalin’s “show trials” to Hollywood disaster movies and beyond. According to 
Žižek, after we have spent a certain amount of time chasing after the virtual expe-
rience of the Real—whether through digitalized special eff ects or pornography 
or reality TV or anything else—“at the end of this process of virtualization . . . we 
begin to experience ‘real reality’ itself as a virtual entity.”17 Moreover, “[f ]or the 
great majority of the public, the WTC [World Trade Center] explosions were 
events on the TV screen, and when we watched the oft-repeated shot of fright-
ened people running towards the camera ahead of a giant cloud of dust from the 
collapsing tower, was not the framing shot itself reminiscent of spectacular shots 
in catastrophe movies, a special eff ect which outdid all others, since—as Jeremy 
Bentham knew—reality is the best appearance of itself?”18 Ultimately, in Žižek’s 
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mind, “it is not only that Hollywood stages a semblance of real life deprived of 
the weight and inertia of materiality—in late-capitalist consumerist society, ‘real 
social life’ itself somehow acquires the features of a staged fake, with our neighbors 
behaving in ‘real’ life like stage actors and extras” and “the ultimate truth of the 
capitalist utilitarian despiritualized universe is the dematerialization of ‘real life’ 
itself, its reversal into a spectral show.”19 And the dilemma we face in this situation 
(if, indeed, this is our situation) is not the diffi  culty of separating “fact” from “fi c-
tion” or the “real” from the “unreal,” but in discerning “the part of fi ction in ‘real’ 
reality” and “in what we experience in fi ction, the hard kernel of the Real that we 
are able to sustain only if we fi ctionalize it.”20 
The essays collected in this volume are concerned with how we might begin to 
trace and possibly unravel some of the intersecting and tangled relations between 
politics and culture, between reality and fi ction, and between the supposed 
 beginnings and endings of history, especially in relation to issues of identity and 
self-formation, morality, statecraft, justice, historiography, and the de-materialization 
of “real life.” We are interested, moreover, in asking: if we are in the midst of a 
kind of crisis of post-histoire, how to historicize such a moment? At the end of 
history, does history reappear, and how? And how might medieval studies be ide-
ally situated to write a new critique of contemporary life, one with an avowed 
commitment to the ethical well-being of our global polis, and that would also, in 
the words of Glenn Burger and Steven Kruger, bring “the medieval into proxim-
ity with the postmodern,” while also “disturb[ing] traditional historical under-
standings of the Middle Ages as either a time of ‘quiet hierarchies’ or of squalid, 
antimodern disorder?”21 This would be a “queer history” that would “enable us 
to think history, and hence our own contemporary moment, otherwise,” and it 
would call into question the ways in which “the postmodern has often been too 
easily proposed as a radical movement beyond a history thought somehow to have 
come to an end.”22 The history of modernity, for the most part, has been written by 
postmodern theorists who often use the Middle Ages as the stand-in for everything 
that was once whole (when a past that possesses totality is crucial to the narrative), 
or crudely barbaric (when a past still in need of progress has to be posited).23
In a talk he gave in 1995 at a conference at Georgetown University, “Cultural 
Frictions: Medieval Cultural Studies in Post-Modern Contexts,” Paul Strohm 
asserted that “postmodernism is preoccupied with history, endlessly obsessed 
with history, and with the nature of the claims the past exerts upon us; it might 
almost be called a way of thinking about history and representation, provoked 
and endlessly refreshed by its refusal to allow fi nal understanding.” Moreover, 
“Postmodern theory has always needed us—that is, needed the past—in the sense 
that it has never not had designs upon us.” Strohm further noted the way postmod-
ernism fundamentally restores “the variegation, the fully contradictory variety 
of the historical surface”—which it does, however, by insisting on a “medieval 
organicism which secretly nourishes the illicit relation between most postmod-
ern culture analysis and the idea of the social ‘totality or whole.’ ”24 Strohm urged 
medievalists to give back to the postmodernists “their honesty . . . by refusing to 
allow them to employ the Middle Ages as a kind of Jurassic Park where they stow 
an ideal of totality which they disavow for their own periods but still need, as an 
absent guarantor of the homologizing critical procedures they want to employ.”25 
Because they know something about the complex heterogeneities of the Middle 
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Ages, and because they bear certain anxious concerns about current aff airs, the 
authors of this volume of essays have some hope for the formulation and practice 
of a medieval cultural studies where the Middle Ages can disturb and disrupt 
the present’s sense of itself as wholly modern and “new,” and where Fukuyama’s 
age of post-histoire will not become the site of the “perpetual caretaking of the 
[static] museum of human history,” but instead will be the place of history’s 
irruption as the still-to-come enclosed in the  what-has-not-yet-been-thought 
about the past and the present.
The Semi-Stillness of Historical Time
It is the aim of our collection to bring together in medieval studies two impor-
tant streams of contemporary humanities scholarship—cultural studies and 
presentism—within the context of the historical view that the Annales School 
historians termed la longue durée (the long wave, or the longest duration of his-
torical time), in order to demonstrate that “[e]ach ‘current event’ brings together 
movements of diff erent origins, of a diff erent rhythm—today’s time dates from 
yesterday, the day before yesterday, and all former times.”26 Their interest in his-
tory lay in its claims upon the present and in the present’s need for it, a notion 
that has some resonance with Walter Benjamin’s idea that to “articulate the past 
historically does not mean to recognize ‘the way it really was’. . . . It means to 
seize hold of a memory as it fl ashes up at a moment of danger.”27 A hallmark 
of these historians’ work was the search for “conjunctures”—trends (intellec-
tual, economic, social, psychic, cultural, etc.) that would illustrate connections 
between diverse yet simultaneous phenomena over time. Fernand Braudel con-
tributed the idea that historical time moves at diff erent speeds, and he conceived 
of history as moving between two poles—that of “the instant” and of the longue 
durée. Braudel wanted to examine what he called the structures underlying all of 
history that exist as constructed realities that “time uses and abuses over time”: 
“Some structures, because of their long life, become stable elements for an infi -
nite number of generations: they get in the way of history, hinder its fl ow, and 
in hindering shape it. Others wear themselves out more quickly. But all of them 
provide both support and hindrance. As hindrances they stand as limits (‘enve-
lopes,’ in the mathematical sense) beyond which man and his experiences cannot 
go.”28 Braudel urged his fellow historians to get used to the “slower tempo” and 
“semi-stillness” of the longue durée, to free themselves “from the demanding time 
scheme of history, to get out of it and return later with a fresh view, burdened 
with other anxieties and other questions.”29
Similar to Braudel’s thought, Edward Said has argued that texts are signifi cant 
forms in which “worldliness, circumstantiality, the text’s status as an event having 
sensuous particularity as well as historical contingency, are . . . part of its capacity 
for conveying and producing meaning,” and, further, that the work of cultural 
criticism itself bears a special responsibility because it embodies “in writing those 
processes and actual conditions in the present by means of which art and writing 
bear signifi cance.”30 It is the contention of the authors of this volume that when 
certain medieval and contemporary cultural texts, such as Robert Mannyng’s 
fourteenth-century penitential manual Handlyng Synne and the reality TV show 
Survivor (Cynthia Ho and James Driggers), or Chaucer’s “Tale of Sir Thopas” and 
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Spike TV’s Joe Schmo Show (Kimberly Bell), are placed alongside each other, they 
reveal mentalities and social conditions that persist over long durations of time 
as well as certain sensuous particularities and historical contingencies unique to 
their respective times of production and reception. We believe, moreover, that 
by spending some time delineating the persistence (or reappearance) of certain 
mentalities and social conditions over time, we can begin to recover (and even, 
repair) what Said describes as the “human cost” implicit in texts that are always, 
at the level of their textuality, “a system of forces institutionalized by the reigning 
culture.”31 Many of the essays in this volume, such as Daniel Kline’s study of the 
aporia of legitimacy at the centers of the Bush and Lancastrian regimes, or Steve 
Guthrie’s account of medieval and more modern legal justifi cations for torture, 
work to demonstrate that when we return to the past with questions framed by the 
present, the present can be rethought—critically, ethically, and politically—in such 
a way that the future opens diff erently as well. For that reason, we have to admit 
that the essays in this volume are more concerned to elucidate and even inter-
vene, intellectually, into present problems—social and political—than they are to 
illuminate the past. Diff ering slightly from the aims of the editors and authors of 
Queering the Middle Ages, who sought to “preposterously” rethink the Middle Ages 
“as the eff ect of a certain self-construction of the modern,” and, by “queering” cer-
tain “stabilized ideas” of the Middle Ages, “to see the Middle Ages . . . in radically 
diff erent, off -center, and revealing ways,”32 the editors and authors of this volume 
are more interested in  rethinking, from the long perspective of a postmodern 
medieval studies, the radically diff erent and preposterous present. 
This brings us to our affi  nities with presentism, a critical strategy most often 
 associated, in literary studies at least, with the Shakespeare scholar Terence 
Hawkes, who has argued that, yes, “we should read Shakespeare historically. 
But given that history results from a never-ending dialogue between past and 
present, how can we decide whose historical circumstances will have priority in 
that process, Shakespeare’s, or our own?”33 As opposed to Stephen Greenblatt, 
who is famous for having begun one of his books with the line, “I began with 
the desire to speak with the dead,” Hawkes desires a criticism that will aim “to 
talk with the living.”34 Presentism is a critical project that “scrupulously seeks 
out salient aspects of the present as a crucial trigger for its investigations” of the 
past, and it is obviously political for Hawkes, who believes strongly that one 
of modernity’s imperatives is a criticism that will undertake “a kind of princi-
pled and self-inventing betrayal of . . . [scholarly] tradition,” and instead of merely 
prosecuting “facts,” will actually execute “a material intervention into history” 
itself.35 Hawkes asks us to consider that “none of us can step beyond time. It 
can’t be drained out of our experience. As a result the critic’s own ‘situated-
ness’ does not—cannot—contaminate the past. In eff ect, it constitutes the only 
means by which it’s possible to see the past and perhaps comprehend it.” Further, 
“[t]o reduce history to a series of isolateable, untheorized ‘facts,’ or neutrally 
analyzable ‘texts,’ is in any case unproductive. Facts do not speak for themselves. 
Nor do texts. . . . unless and until they are inserted into and perceived as part of 
specifi c discourses which impose their own shaping requirements and agendas. 
We choose the facts. We choose the texts. We do the inserting. We do the per-
ceiving. Facts and texts, that is to say, don’t simply speak. We speak, we mean, 
by them.”36
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Ultimately, presentism, like Said’s worldy criticism, desires to see what an 
older text might say and do in the here and now against the idea that it can only 
speak in the terms of the world to which it more pointedly refers. One result of 
this approach is the reversal of what Hawkes calls “apparently immutable con-
ceptual hierarchies,” such as primary/secondary and past/present, as well as the 
calling into question of certain underlying assumptions about the relationships 
between those concepts. The idea is not to distort our understanding of the past 
as it really was by viewing it through overly contemporary sensibilities, but rather 
to bring the past and present into creative tension with each other in order to 
reveal what James Earl has called “the residues of history stored in the metaphors 
of cultural life.”37 Often, this will involve making what may seem at fi rst to be 
tenuous (or outright bogus) connections between apparently incongruous items, 
such as between a medieval dream vision and PBS’s historical reality TV program 
Manor House (Betsy McCormick), or between a suicide bomber in contemporary 
Russia and Grendel in Beowulf (Eileen Joy). It would be fruitless to argue that the 
connections between past and present texts crafted in this volume are not tenuous, 
or even arbitrary in certain respects, but they are also attempts to delineate what 
Jeff rey Jerome Cohen has called the “traumas, exclusions, [and] violences enacted 
centuries ago” that “might still linger in contemporary identity formations,” and 
to also explore a past that “could be multiple and valuable enough to contain (and 
be contained within) alternative presents and futures.”38 As Cohen writes in his 
afterword to our volume, in our “insistence upon the intimacy of the medieval 
within the modern and the modern within the medieval,” our essays “collectively 
argue for a theory of intertemporality, of an interpenetration of remote times and 
histories,” that, again, helps us to think history otherwise, as Nancy Partner does 
when she locates the origins of the realist novel, not in the philosophical episte-
mologies of the Enlightenment, where it is usually located, but in the “incorpo-
rated fi ctions” of medieval historiography, which also “reappear” in the simulated 
“reenactments” of the evening news.
Examples of critical work in medieval studies that read past historical texts and 
mentalities through the trigger of “salient aspects of the present” are rare in our 
fi eld, although the list of published titles is growing.39 Nevertheless, presentism 
is often considered a dirty word in medieval studies, where many believe that 
trying to understand the past on its own historical ground is the only authentic 
work that can be done. There is much contention in our fi eld over how the kind 
of present-minded historical scholarship, fi rst formulated by the Annales histo-
rians and later developing into area studies, cultural studies, and postcolonial 
studies, might best be developed in medieval studies, and along what lines.40 
Caroline Walker Bynum provides one tentative answer with which the editors 
of this volume would concur, when she writes that “the past is seldom usefully 
examined by assuming that its specifi c questions or their settings are the same 
as those of the present. What may, however, be the same is the way in which a 
question, understood in its context, struggles with a perduring issue such as, for 
example, group affi  liation.”41 Jeff rey Cohen’s oeuvre also provides other tentative 
answers, and it is precisely because so much of his work has been devoted to 
the idea of the Middle Ages as both “alluringly strange” and “discomfortingly 
familiar” to modernity that we asked him to write the afterword to this book. In 
his introduction to the edited volume The Postcolonial Middle Ages, Cohen argues 
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that medieval studies “must stress not diff erence (the past as past) or sameness (the 
past as present) but temporal interlacement, the impossibility of choosing alterity 
or continuity (the past that opens up the present to possible futures).”42 While 
Cohen has insistently asked medievalists to consider the place of the modern in 
the medieval and the medieval in the modern—their “temporal interlacement,” 
or “temporal interplacement,” as he puts it in his afterword here—he also ques-
tions contemporary cultural studies’ marking off  of the past as irrelevant to its 
concerns.43 And this brings us, fi nally, to the question of what we mean when we 
say that our work in this volume is “medieval cultural studies.”
The Question of “Being-Together”
One of the chief objectives of this volume is to demonstrate the value of medi-
evalists doing cultural studies. But what do we mean when we say “cultural 
studies”? On one level it simply entails, in this volume at least, studying artifacts 
of contemporary popular and political culture—whether those artifacts be real-
ity TV programs, fi lms, photographs, White House propaganda, legal memos, 
or the reports of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—and bringing to the 
analysis of those artifacts the longest historical perspective possible. It also entails 
something Richard Johnson discusses in his much-cited essay “What Is Cultural 
Studies Anyway?,” where he wrote that the object of cultural studies is not the 
text itself (whether that text be a book or a television program), but the “social life 
of subjective forms at each moment of their circulation in the text.”44 Nevertheless, 
we understand that “cultural studies” is ultimately a much-vexed phrase, as well 
as a set of often disparate intellectual practices and fi elds that have developed 
over time, and there are many debates over what, exactly, cultural studies is. In 
its fi rst incarnation, in Britain in the 1950s, according to the cultural theorist 
Simon During, it had two characteristic features: “It concentrated on ‘subjectiv-
ity,’ which means that it studied culture in relation to individual lives, breaking 
with social scientifi c positivism or ‘objectivism,’ ” and it was “an engaged form 
of analysis” that “worked in the interests of those who have the least resources. 
In this it diff ered not only from the (apparently) objective social sciences but 
from the older forms of cultural criticism, especially literary criticism, which 
considered political questions as being of peripheral relevance to the appreciation 
of culture.”45 Early cultural studies in Britain was very much rooted in local and 
communal forms of working-class life, and when that began to fragment, espe-
cially in the 1970s, theorists began to see culture as a form of hegemony, and it 
was therefore “thought about less as an expression of local communal lives and 
more as an apparatus within a large system of domination, [and] cultural studies 
off ered critiques of culture’s hegemonic eff ects.”46 The dominant theorists in this 
period were Pierre Bourdieu, Michel de Certeau, and Michel Foucault, whose 
work often concentrated on individuals living in settings constituted and ordered 
by various institutions in symbolic and hierarchical ways. More recently, cultural 
studies has become a site for the study of marginal and minority discourses, espe-
cially those outside the West or those that are migrant or diasporic within the 
West, and there has even been, in some quarters, a “celebration of commercial 
culture.”47 Ultimately, according to During, “cultural studies is a discipline con-
tinuously shifting its interests and methods because it is in constant and engaged 
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interaction with its larger historical context and because it cannot be complacent 
about its authority.”48
As to the future direction of cultural studies, During looks forward to an 
“engaged cultural studies” that will examine “its temporal border: the separation 
of past from present (asking, what the role of history is in contemporary cultural 
studies).”49 It is precisely to this question of history’s role in cultural studies, and 
to the temporal borders that supposedly mark off  the fi eld of inquiry in cultural 
studies from the past, that our book partly addresses itself. We are still left with 
the term, engaged, by which During means not just a cultural studies engaged 
with examining its own history, but also politically engaged. More specifi cally, 
During writes that engaged cultural studies is academic work “that aims to pro-
duce knowledge from perspectives lost to and in dominant public culture, and 
to listen to far-off  and marginalized voices,” and which would also be “a way of 
shoring up diff erences and counter-hegemony inside the humanities in an epoch 
of global managerialisms.”50 This question of the political nature of cultural 
studies, especially of a North American yet also medieval and Anglophile cultural 
studies, which this volume mainly expostulates, requires, we believe, some fur-
ther elaboration here.
Our brief summary of During’s overview of the history of cultural stud-
ies attends mainly to how this history has unfolded in Britain. According to 
Jonathan Culler, in Britain, “the very fact of studying popular culture was an act 
of [political] resistance [against high culture], in a way that it isn’t in the United 
States, where national identity has often been defi ned against high culture.”51 
Therefore, in the United States, “it is scarcely self-evident that shunning high 
culture to study popular culture is a politically radical or resistant gesture.”52 And 
since it is generally agreed upon that “the production of national subjects” is no 
longer the central aim of the university, 
it is perfectly all right for academics in universities to analyze and to teach all sorts 
of cultural materials and practices. This is not necessarily subversive. It feeds right 
into the culture industry and even constitutes something like its exotic arm. The 
American press is amused by cultural studies and likes to run stories about aca-
demics writing about Madonna or cereal boxes. Cultural studies is a continuation 
of journalism, on the one hand and, on the other, a contribution to the general 
disdain for academics, who are thought to make a complicated fuss about things 
that really should simply be consumed.53
Somewhat less damning, but still attuned to the dangers inherent in academic work 
done in North America under the rubric of “cultural studies,” are Paul Strohm’s 
remarks that, “[i]n exchange for the relative freedom gained by separating itself 
from the materialist premise [in favor of a focus on textuality] . . . North American 
cultural studies has dealt away its principal means of maintaining itself as a practice 
separate from the larger range of available poststructural theories and rationales 
against which it seeks to defi ne itself.”54 In Strohm’s mind, there is some danger in 
cultural studies aligning itself too closely with  postmodernism since postmodern-
ism’s power, as an explanatory critical model, is partly derived from its “status as 
the cultural aspect of a triumphalist, transnational, market-oriented, late capitalist 
hegemony.”55 The dilemma, especially in medieval studies that also claim to be 
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“medieval cultural studies,” is in determining how to embrace the postmodern 
insight regarding the messy, heterogeneous, and multi-perspectivist nature of social 
experience “without ceding our right to an ethical self-positioning.” Although 
we can certainly decline the role of “authoritative observer” that postmodernism 
has so successfully dismantled, Strohm argues that “we need not remain bored, 
serene, or indiff erent,” because “history (past and present) is full of people placed 
in circumstances that require care, full of people who can’t not care. Such historical 
actors can neither be everywhere nor be nowhere; they have no choice but to be 
somewhere.” Strohm suggests we position ourselves “provisionally, precariously, 
temporarily, maybe sometimes bemusedly—but always somewhere. And  wherever 
this somewhere is, that it be an invested place, a place that knows things are at 
stake.”56
We are aware of the fact that much cultural criticism that calls itself politi-
cal (or “engaged”) is only tangentially so, and it will be clear from the subject 
matter of this book, which includes, for example, the highly charged subjects of 
suicide terrorism and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, that we 
are very concerned to position ourselves in an ethico-critical place “that knows 
things are at stake.” But we are not willing, either, to simply claim our work is 
political because its subject matter is political or because we express politically 
invested viewpoints. We know we have to think more deeply about how it is, in 
writing this book, our work is engaged, and in what way?
In 2003 the editors of Critical Inquiry organized a symposium to address, 
among other matters, the future of literary criticism and theory as well as the 
question of whether or not contemporary critical thought has “backed off  from 
its earlier sociopolitical engagements.”57 W.J.T. Mitchell, one of the journal’s 
editors, asked: “What can criticism and theory do to counteract the forces of 
militarism, unilateralism, and the perpetual state of emergency that is now the 
explicit policy of the U.S. government? What good is intellectual work in the 
face of the deeply anti-intellectual ethos of American public life?”58 Stanley Fish 
raised the troubling argument (or is it a fact?) that politics “does not need our 
professional help; texts do.”59 Other participants, however, expressed a great deal 
of anxiety over the idea of a literary or cultural studies shorn of any kind of 
political raison d’être, and they also worried about a future where critics don’t pay 
enough attention to how culture (and cultural thought) shape that future. J. Hillis 
Miller worried especially over what the role of the university can possibly be 
now that “those in power no longer think universities—their students, faculty, 
and administrations—are worth bothering much about, so little social infl uence 
do they have.” In response to Fish’s charge that  literary criticism can only ever 
be about texts, while Miller conceded that scholarly writing may have no actual 
infl uence in the political realm, he also stated that “it is diffi  cult these days to 
just stand by doing nothing, to go on . . . teaching within the parameters of our 
disciplines, doing ‘what we do around here.’ ”60 This sentiment was echoed by 
Françoise Meltzer who asked, “what it tells us about the humanities that they can 
seem like a luxury in the face of impending political catastrophe.”61
What the editors of this volume believe we can say about the role of cultural 
studies in relation to current aff airs is that all times in history are, in one way or 
another, times of crisis and catastrophe, and as Danielle Allen argued at the sym-
posium, criticism “has generally been an instrument for coming to understand 
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political orders and phenomenon and then for intervening in them.” More to the 
specifi c purposes of our collection, Allen further commented, “If one wishes to 
know how language is working and shaping our world, one needs to know not 
just how it plays, obscures, reveals, and subverts, but also where human social 
orders are explicitly (and not just implicitly) held together by words: the realms 
of law and punishment, of value and the division of labor (gender and sexual-
ity come in here), of religion, of organized strife (from athletic events to war), 
of membership in imagined communities like ‘the people,’ and of generational 
transition.”62 Many of the essays in this book explicitly address overtly politi-
cal subjects, such as the Bush administration’s policies on torture (Guthrie and 
Moore), the absence of legitimate authority in the Bush White House (Kline), 
and female Chechen suicide bombers ( Joy), and other essays attend to the ways 
in which certain “real-life” fi ctions and social imaginaries have overdetermined 
our understanding of our history, our current moment, and ourselves (Partner, 
Bell, Weisl, Ho and Driggers, McCormick, and Seaman and Green). It may be 
naïve to say so, but we do believe our work here represents a collective inter-
vention into histories, medieval and modern, in order to expose time(s) diff erently, 
and it is by doing so together that we locate the center of our political engagement. 
This is the engagement Bill Readings partly outlines in his book The University 
in Ruins, where he argues that, even though the university has lost its imprimatur 
as an institution that authorizes culture, or that serves as a model of the “ideal 
society,” it has become “one site among others where the question of being-together is 
raised, raised with an urgency that proceeds from the absence of the institutional 
forms (such as the nation-state), which have historically served to mask that ques-
tion for the past three centuries or so.”63 As medievalists who are, whether we 
like it or not, the inheritors of a humanist tradition, we bear a special responsibil-
ity to the idea that the life devoted to reading, refl ection, and letters retains some 
power in the matter of how history “turns out.” In the setting of the university, 
however ruined, that has been given to us as a kind of gift, we might recall the 
words of the poet Czeslaw Milosz: “The fabric of language has a constant pro-
pensity to come off  from reality, and our eff orts to glue them together are in most 
cases futile—yet absolutely necessary.”64
* * *
The fi rst half of the book, “Part I: Medieval, Reality, Television,” comprises 
essays that explore connections between medieval texts and contemporary reality 
TV programs. In chapter 1, “Models of (Im)Perfection: Parodic Refunctioning 
in Spike TV’s The Joe Schmo Show and Geoff rey Chaucer’s ‘Tale of Sir Thopas,’ ” 
Kimberly Bell analyzes how a contest based reality TV series and a medieval pseudo-
romance both off er, through parody, metafi ctional critiques of their respective 
genres and stereotypes of masculinity, while also demonstrating the power of 
fi ction to instantiate social realities. Chapter 2, Angela Jane Weisl’s “ ‘She appears 
as brightly radiant as she once was foul’: Medieval Conversion Narratives and 
Contemporary Makeover Shows,” demonstrates how—often through ritu-
als of public humiliation, pain, and self-abnegation—both medieval and more 
 contemporary conversion narratives reinscribe social norms on the bodies and 
minds of individuals (typically women) who are seeking change. Analyzing 
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the process of individual transformation in medieval works such as the plays of 
Hrotsvit of Gandersheim, the epic Prise d’Orange, and the Auchinlek King of Tars, 
and in reality makeover programs such as What Not to Wear, Extreme Makeover, 
and The Swan, Weisl examines how the process of conversion is ultimately “a 
means of controlling what appears dangerous or threatening to the social order,” 
and almost always benefi ts the dominant community more than it does the indi-
vidual. For Weisl, the popularity of makeover shows suggests “a persistent fasci-
nation with  conversion that refl ects gaps and fi ssures in contemporary society, as 
medieval grace is replaced by normative standards of appearance.” In chapter 3, 
“Outwit, Outplay, Outlast: Moral Lessons from Handlyng Synne and Survivor,” 
Cynthia Ho and James Driggers show how Robert Mannyng’s early fourteenth-
century medieval penitential manual and a highly popular reality competition 
series both utilize reality-fi ctions in order to catechize their audiences regarding 
supposed cultural or moral “truths.” Though Handlyng Synne and Survivor are 
radically diff erent cultural productions with diff erent intentions—the former is 
a Christian handbook for confession and the latter a corporate game show—Ho 
and Driggers delineate some of the ways in which both texts illustrate the perils of 
trying to reconcile economic gain with moral status, as well as individual desires 
with community mores. Whereas Handlyng Synne ultimately places the emphasis on 
community health and the “truth” of salvation over individual success, Survivor “enacts 
a version of capitalism obsessed with validating its own power in spite of the needs of 
any given individual, social community, or larger moral arbiter.” In chapter 4, “Back to 
the Future: Living the Liminal Life in the Manor House and the Medieval Dream,” Betsy 
McCormick compares the dream visions of Christine de Pisan and Chaucer (in the Livre 
de la Cité des Dames and Legend of Good Women, respectively) and the PBS historical 
reality show Manor House as examples of liminal game spaces within which individu-
als can perform alternate and experimental social roles. Although liminal game spaces 
off er the promise of radical experimentation with certain cultural realities supposedly left 
behind, the “individual performances within these reality experiments reveal the 
power of rigid cultural and social stereotypes to attract, to overwhelm, or even 
to subsume the individual.” But the liminal experience also allows us, fi nally, “to 
live in the real.”
Between Parts I and II of the book we have included a clasp, or hinge, titled 
“Entertaining Histories/Historical Entertainments”: chapter 5, “Medieval 
Histories and Modern Realism: Yet Another Origin of the Novel,” by Nancy 
Partner, and chapter 6, “Sacrifi cing Fiction and the Quest for the Real King 
Arthur,” by Myra Seaman and John Green. Partner’s essay is actually a reprint 
of an article that appeared in Modern Language Notes in 1999, but which has been 
so infl uential upon much of the work behind this volume that we felt we had to 
republish it here. Long before the editors and some of the authors convened at 
the 2004 meeting of the Southeastern Medieval Association in Charleston, South 
Carolina, to deliver papers on “remaking the Middle Ages on reality television,” 
Partner had already made the connection in her article, where she writes that an 
evening news “simulation” of a domestic violence incident reveals “the conven-
tions of medieval history-writing reincarnated in electronic communications on 
the cusp of the twenty-fi rst century . . . like a ghost in the machine.” According to 
Partner, “the imaginative gratifi cations involved in what we might call the fi c-
tions of the real, which were eventually banished from generic nonfi ction were, 
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in various degrees, part of the medieval historian’s obligation to his readers and to 
his own reputation. It is easy to forget this because the later crisp generic separa-
tion between fi ction and history which marks  modern literary production and 
reception, awarded the prize of reader satisfaction entirely to fi ction.” Partner’s 
essay provides an overview of the truth-in-fi ction techniques of medieval histori-
ographers in order to investigate the questions: “what sort of linguistic thing is it 
that claims to be a true representation of human reality-in-time? And what does it 
mean that this truth-claiming literature, until very recently, was routinely infl ated 
with counter-factual, anti-evidentiary, unverifi able depictions? Is history, qua his-
tory as cultural artifact, substantially changed by its incorporation of fi ction?” 
Ultimately, these are signifi cant questions about genre, “grounded in historical 
literary culture, with transhistorical  epistemological implications.” In their essay 
that follows Partner’s, and to whose thought and scholarship on fi ction and truth 
in historical narratives they admit a great debt, Seaman and Green analyze the 
visual texts of the 2004 fi lm King Arthur and the History Channel’s documentary 
The Quest for King Arthur, in order to document a lingering positivistic desire to 
authorize history by removing the fi ctitious and leaving only what is archaeologi-
cally verifi able. Despite this desire, an analysis of both texts reveals a dependence 
upon the very fi ctions that have been supposedly rejected by the fi lmmakers who 
continually assert that their productions reveal the “ real man” behind the legend. 
In their accommodation of chronicle and romance, medieval historiographers dis-
played less anxiety over the use-value of historical fi ctions about Arthur, perhaps 
because they understood better than modern artists, or modern historians, that 
legendary stories are already closer to the “real” man than history, which comes 
later, ever can be.
The second half of the book, “Part II: Medieval, Reality, Politics,” is com-
posed of essays that address contemporary political crises from the perspective of 
medieval history, or literature, or both. Chapter 7, “The Crisis of Legitimation 
in Bush’s America and Henry IV’s England,” by Daniel Kline, analyzes the “pol-
itics of an eternal present” that traverses the gap of authentic legitimacy that 
Kline asserts forms the blank center of both the Bush and Lancastrian regimes. 
Legitimation follows, and doesn’t precede, the creation of fi ctive pasts that autho-
rize present administrative rules, and history is thereby removed as a problem. 
Both the Bush White House and Henry IV’s rule are actually postmodern in 
their reliance on performativity, Derrida’s “logic of the supplement,” blurring the 
distinctions between fact and fi ction, and ethical relativism. But the Bush White 
House is also medieval, similar to Henry IV’s administration, in its blending of 
theology with politics, its crusading mentality, use of prophecy, and demoniza-
tion of political opponents. In chapter 8, “Torture, Inquisition, Medievalism, 
Reality, TV,” Steve Guthrie examines the history of torture in classical law, the 
Inquisition, and Tudor England, in relation to the practice of torture as authorized 
by the infamous White House legal memorandums regarding the treatment of 
“enemy combatants,” and he argues that these memos “justify practices consis-
tent with late-medieval and early-modern defi nitions of torture in the prosecu-
tion of religious and political crimes” while also making “no reference to these 
precedents” and refusing “to identify the practices as torture.” Ultimately, there 
is an important distinction that needs to be made between “judicial torture” and 
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a type of “village games” sadism—a diff erence that was fi rmly set in medieval 
law but “hedged to the vanishing point” in current American law and practice. 
Continuing in this vein is chapter 9, “Wolves, Outlaws, and Enemy Combatants,” 
where Michael Moore compares U.S. policies regarding the imprisonment and 
treatment of “enemy combatants” with medieval practices of banishment and out-
lawry. Whereas “Tocqueville once described the old Prussian State as a strange 
monster, having a modern head [tête moderne] sitting uneasily atop a gothic body 
[corps gothique],” in the period beginning in 2001, the United States has appeared 
to do the reverse, adopting “a number of pre-modern legal concepts and prac-
tices, among which are torture, clandestine prisons, lettres de cachet, and outlawry, 
thereby giving the impression that the American State, atop its vibrantly modern 
social and economic body, had placed a crude medieval head, une tête gothique.” 
Therefore, “[p]rimitive aspects of early medieval law (banishment and outlawry) 
have been revived, marking a retreat from the highest achievements of medie-
val law (due process and legal humanism).” In chapter 10, “Exteriority Is Not 
a Negation But a Marvel: Hospitality, Terrorism, Levinas, Beowulf,” Eileen Joy 
compares the situation of the female Chechen suicide terrorist in contempo-
rary Russia and Grendel in the Old Engish poem Beowulf alongside Emmanuel 
Levinas’s  thinking on hospitality, in order to examine the ways in which terroris-
tic violence (whether the anthrophagy of a Grendel or the belted bomb of a suicide 
terrorist) simultaneously summons and accuses us as those who are irreplaceable. 
Joy acknowledges that the correlation between the suicide bombers and Grendel 
is an overly tenuous one, but she argues that, “while both the Chechen women 
and Grendel are viewed in their respective cultures as fi gures of exorbitant exteri-
ority, nevertheless, they are mainly terrifying for the ways in which they bring to 
vivid life (and death) the obscene violence at the interior heart of states that mark 
the place of a supposedly more ethical community.”
In addition to the brief foreword by Nancy Partner, “Medieval Presentism 
before the Present,” that opens the collection and a brief afterword by Jeff rey 
Jerome Cohen,  “Intertemporality,” that closes it, we have also included an 
otherword by Michael Uebel, “Opening Time: Psychoanalysis and Medieval 
Culture.” Although this chapter may seem at fi rst not to fi t with the other chap-
ters in the volume, it has been included precisely because it performs a function 
intimately related to our subject matter here (medievalists practicing an engaged 
cultural studies) but not articulated anywhere else in the volume: it formulates a 
theory of psychoanalytic medievalism that is particularly well suited to “advance 
the terms by which temporality can be understood as a vital (cross-) disciplinary 
concern.” Directly confronting the “tone of defeatism” and conservative rigid-
ity in medieval studies’ general attitude toward cultural studies, Uebel argues 
that many medievalists “tend to indulge themselves in a knowledge of the past 
that they make little if any attempt to translate to the present, let alone the 
future. The vast majority of medievalist scholarship is tragically myopic, failing 
to see the deep and vital connections between past, present, and future épistêmes, 
actions, and aff ectivities.” In Uebel’s view, psychoanalysis, especially in its “grap-
pling with the dialectical role of the future in the presently existing personality 
structure,” represents “a crucial way of avoiding both intellectual rigidity and 
political sterility.” 
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